corresponding fo rm of defi nition. If the purpose of a law is to mandate diverse treatment of individuals based on race or eth nicity, the law must be quite precise about who fa lls into which category, because an administrator is expected to make clear dis ti nctions in individual cases. Hence, it is not surprising that laws on race became more precise fo llowing the abolition of slavery, especially as segregation hardened in the post-Reconstruction South, and that segregation laws contained quite precise defini tions. On the other hand if a law is intended to prevent differ ential treatment, there is much less need fo r specifying who is what; in fact, legislators are likely to be very uncomfortable about definitions. Finally, when laws are intended to mandate aggregate changes in ethnic composition in social institutions -em ployment, education, or political participation, fo r example there is a need fo r workable generalizations upon wh ich aggre gate data can be collected, but not a need for accurate determi nation in each individual case. Hence, loose definitions that work more or less well (Hispanic surnames, for example) may be all that is considered necessary to achieve the overall goal, in spite of their under-and over-inclusiveness in individual cases.
These three models reflect, roughly, the historical develop ment of American laws on race and ethnicity, but the correspon dence is punctuated with transitions and inconsistencies. Our interest is in the policy implications of each model, rather than in trying to impose or infer a strict sequential order. But public policy is not a "seamless web" or a rational ordering of rules. Just as the American polity and decision-making process is frag mented, disorderly policy results reflect the inconsistent aims of competing communities. The current peculiar mixture of elabo rate guidelines and awkward defi nitions reflects the soci ety's ambivalence between non-discrimination (color-blind) and affir mative action (color-conscious) policy goals. Indeed, it is the simultaneous existence of the second and third models wh ich makes the contemporary American approach to race and ethnic ity so complex.
Furthermore, a close look at eth nic policy reveals the impor tance of "who is what,"but also of "which groups counts." Why do African Americans and Hispanics count as minorities for pur poses of the 1965 Voting Rights Law but not Hasidic Jews? Why are there affi rmative action programs for Asians and Hispanics but not fo r Arabs and Irish? Obviously it is a matter of perceived needs and priorities. There is absolutely no logic in dividing America's population into White, Black, Hispanic, Native American, and Asian, as though the terms were exclusive and comprehensive; the distinction is purely a matter of conven ience. For some purposes, a simple separation may be all that is necessary -"white" and "nonwhite." For other purposes we sep arate out the so-called "white-ethnics" and count Southern and Eastern Europeans as minorities. At some times Asians are clas sified together; in World War II, it became crucial to disti nguish Japanese from all other Asians. In some parts of the country "Hispanic" means Mexican-American, in other parts Cuban or Puerto Rican, and in other parts there are too few to make a dif ference. In most of the United States, "black" will do to delin eate African Americans from Whites; in parts of the East coast, it can be usefu l to distinguish "native" Blacks from West Indian Blacks. In most of the states, Alaskan natives are just that; in Alaska public policy purposes can require more precise cate gories. A similar paradigm can be posited for Hawaii between Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians. In short fo r public policy pur poses ethnicity is politically defi ned, and ethnological precision simply does not matter. Words, like tools, reflect the needs of the people who use them; where all we need is a meat axe, we are not likely to fi nd surgical scalpels.
II
By fa r the most extensive use of race and ethnicity in American law has been to enforce racial separation and to perpetuate a complex social hierarchy. Such laws seem to serve two closely rel ated purposes. Some are intended to ensure separation-anti miscegenation laws are the most obvious; in addition, laws requiring racial segregation in schools, fac ilities of transportation and accommodation are of this type. Second, laws may be aimed at preserving the inferior status of minorities by mandat ing, infe rior treatment -for example, laws requiring certain acts of social deference by Blacks towards Whites, laws preventing Blacks from attending certain schools and univers ities, voting, serving on juries or entering certain professions, or laws prohibiting Asians from own ing land served this purpose. Given the pre-eminence of race in the American experience, the great bulk of both ki nds of law deal with the relationship between whites and nonwh ites.
Laws stipulating the proper relationship between the races were adopted very early in the colonial period. These formative policies reflect a quite unself-consc ious bel ief in white superior ity and an acceptance of hierarchy as part of the natu re of thi ngs. The early status of Africans was ambiguous; most arrived as slaves, but African slavery was not recognized as a legal institu tion until around 1640. The first such laws, therefore, were con cerned with regulati ng the social status of blacks and creating the institutions of slavery. By the fi rst years of the eighteenth centu ry, extensive codes regul ated occupation, residence, and mar riage. The Revolution did not create any dramatic change in this kind of law, except that they became more elaborate as the prac tice of slavery became institutionalized in Southern and border states. As slavery was abolished in the North it was replaced by segregation laws. Reconstruction changes were extremely short lived. The most extensive use of racial defi nitions in American law is a post-Reconstruction phenomenon, beginning with the Black Codes and elaborated more extensively in a half century of Jim Crow laws, which persisted well past the midpoint of the 20 t h century.
Seemingly ignorant of the expanding process of mestizaje much less of the mixing of Africans and Europeans already root ed in Spanish America, at the beginning of their settlements in America the English did not foresee any need to define race; it seemed too obvious to need defi nition. Africans begot Africans in the New World as in the old in the same way that English begot English in both worlds, and racial disti nctions were seen as an unam biguous part of the order of nature, but the occurrence of unions between Blacks and Whites in British America created a need for racial defi nitions. The first response was the adoption of anti-miscegenation laws; they were already on the books in Maryland and Vi rgi nia by the 1 660s. The majority of the colonies enacted statutes designed to outlaw not only marriage, but also any sexual relations between Whites and others. Allowing fo r variation from colony to colony, such statutes also provided fo r punishing ministers who conducted interracial marriage cere monies, enslavement or banishment of white women who entered proscribed marriages, payment of double fi nes by those who engaged in interracial fo rnication, and placement of the off spring of interracial sex into the slave status of the mother if the mother was black and into enslavement if the mother was wh ite. In general the penalty was fa r more severe on the black partner than on the white one, and, needless to say, extra-legal enforce ment was fa r more Draconian than anyth ing fo und in the code books. 2 Laws were powerless in the face of human nature. Interracial unions continued to occur and thus forced Euro Americans to reconsider their understanding of race. According to a chronicler of the colonial period, Vi rginia was "swarming with mulattoes." What had seemed simple and unambiguous became clouded by gradations and complexities. The response to this complexity displayed two contradi ctory impulses, a simul ta neous desire both to recognize and to deny these ambigu ities. On the one hand almost every state wrote into its laws some offi cial defi nition of the gradations of race; on the other hand the same laws obliterated any significance of those gradations by collapsing the categories back to "white" and "nonwhite." The gradations ranged from the use of the term mulatto to defi ne per sons of black and wh ite parentage to the more elaborate Louisiana code that delineated degrees of whiteness through seven previous generations ) Fluctuations in the U.S. Census racial classifi cations are especially instructive. They remind us that the definition of who was black has been determi ned from the beginning by Whites. Even though the colonies had legislated degrees of blackness and Whites and Blacks had been identified in every census, beginning with the first one in 1 790, it was only in 1850 with the Seventh Census, that the Bureau of the Census made a distinc tion between mulattoes and Blacks. The 1850 Census classified the population as white, black, or mulatto, although there were no instructions fo r defining "mulatto." In contrast to the mod ern census a person did not identify his or her category; rather it was left to the enumerator to determine. In the 1870 and 1880 censuses mulattoes were officially defined to include "quadroons, octoroons, and persons having any perceptible trace of African blood." The interest in specificity reached its height in the 1890 Census. The enumerators were instructed:
Be particularly carefu l to disti nguish between blacks, mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons. The word 'black' should be used to describe those persons who have three-fourths or more black blood; 'mulatto,' those persons who have three-eighths to five-eighths black blood; 'quadroon,' those persons who have one fourth black blood; 'octoroons,' those persons have one-eighth or any trace of black blood.4
It is not at all clear how enumerators were expected to gath er this information, and its useless complexity was abandoned after 1900 in favor of the simplified classifi cations, "black" and "mulatto." The mulatto category was dropped in 1920, and from that year forward anyone with any perceptible Black African ancestry was simply defined as Negro. These determinations were made by census enumerators until the 1960 census, which then rested the determination with the head of household responsible fo r fi lling out the census form.5
These examples demonstrate an inconsistency of racial pol icy within the first model. States were making quite explicit and elaborate racial distinctions and then negati ng them by treating persons of all gradations as black. North Carolina, fo r example, carefu lly defi ned mulattoes as persons with one-sixteenth Negro ancestry and then proceeded to classify mulattoes as Negroes for the purposes of its law.6 Louisiana is quite instructive. Recall the detailed provisions in the state's law. Also recall that Plessy v. Ferguson, the case in which the Supreme Court gave constitu tionality to the doctrine of separate but equal, invo lved a Louisiana law which required racially separate ra ilroad accom modations, and that Homer Plessy's challenge was based in part on his objection to Louisiana's classifying him as black since he was seven-eighths white.? Clearly the elaborate distinction of Louisiana's laws served no ascertainable purpose.
The general pattern of these laws is quite clear. The real interest was not in determining who was black but who was not white. What emerged was an algorithm fo r distinguishing Whites and nonwhites. The Alabama code is typical: " ... the word "negro" includes mulatto. The word "mulatto" or term "person of color" means a person of mixed blood descended on the part of the father or mother from negro ancestors, without ref erence to or limit of time or number of generations. 8 Perhaps the clearest attempt to make a simple distinction between white and nonwh ite is fo u nd in the Georgia code, which provides that and All Negroes, mulattoes, mestizoes, and their descen dants, having any ascertainable trace of either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic blood in their veins, and all descendants of any person having either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins shall be known in this state as persons of color.
The term 'white person' shall include only persons of the white or Caucasian race, who have no ascerta ina ble trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in their veins. No person, any of whose ancestors [was] ... a colored person or person of color, shall be deemed to be a white person. 9 Since "Chinese, Japanese, Mongolians ... " were not white, it is no surprise to fi nd the Supreme Court upholding local decisions to assign a Chinese student to a Negro school.lO The "white" classifi cation remained always the most exclusive.
Above all the attempt to be precise reflects the needs of a soci ety that classifies people according to race. Laws that required separation and disparate treatment were intended to be applied to individuals in specific instances. Segregation laws provide an excellent example. If railroad conductors were to know whom to assign to which rai lroad cars, they needed fa irly precise guideli nes fo r knowing whom to seat where. Indeed a mistake was a cause fo r collecting damages." If laws were to prevent Blacks or Asians from attending white schools, serving on juries, holding certain federal jobs, patronizing places of pub lic accommodation, or regu lati ng issues of fam ily and criminal law, then officials needed guidelines that could be applied in individual cases. Mathematical or scientifi c certainty of degrees of race was not only necessity but it was presumed to be possi ble. By virtue of judicial pronouncement, a litigant could enter a courtroom as a black person and leave as a mulatto or white person. Fo r example in Jones v. Commonwealth, Isaac jones successfu lly appealed his sentence of almost three years fo r mar rying a white woman contrary to "the peace and dignity" of the Commonwealth of Vi rginia whose law fo rbade marriage between "Negroes" and Whites and defi ned a Negro as a person with "one-fourth or more negro blood." Mr. jones asserted that he had less than one-quarter black blood. Although the court found that jones was a "mulatto of brown skin" and that his mother was a "yellow woman," it fo und that the Commonwealth was unable to establish the "quantum of negro blood in his veins." The precept, "anyone who is not wh ite is colored," although imperfect, did minimize ambiguity.
Clearly, most of the laws precisely defining race are artifacts of the segregation era. But since law is not a "seamless web," we fi nd vestiges of these kinds of definition in an era when their pol icy function is fa r from obvious. Two decades ago, a dispute arose over Louisiana's law requiring anyone of more than 1 /3 2 African descent to be classified as black. Louisiana's 1/32 law is of relatively recent vintage; unti l 1971 the law had relied on "common repute" for racial classifications; the return to the older fo rm was intended to eliminate rac ial classifi cations by gossip and infe rence. In September of 1982 Mrs. Susie Guillory Phipps, having discovered that her birth certifi cate classified her as Colored, petitioned to have her classification changed to White, to reflect "her true status as a Caucasian." The state obj ected and produ ced an eleven-generation genealogy tracing Mrs. Phipps's ancestry back to an early eighteenth-century black slave and a white plantation owner. Mrs. Phipps's argument centered on the ina pp ro pr iateness of ap pl ying racial designations to individuals accurately and the impossibility of determining racial ancestry precisely to meet judicial standards of evidence. In th is curious case and the anachronistic issue it represents the u.S. Supreme Court sided with Louisiana. 1 2
Although the blac k/w hite distinction has been most perva sive, clearly Blacks have not been the only nonwhites. The def inition of Asian-Americans has a history of its own, centering largely on naturalization and immigration chall enges. The Naturalization Act of 1 790 provided that only free white persons could become citizens, and in spite of numerous changes over the years, including providing for the naturalization of persons of "African nativity, " Asians continued to be ineligible fo r citizen ship until the Second World War. In the late nineteenth century both Chinese and japanese did enter the country, but they could not be naturalized to be citizens unless they were "white." Asians sought naturalization under the existi ng standards, but always as Whites. For example, in 1878 Chinese were denied citizenship because "a native of China, of the Mongolian race, is not a white person." Then in 1922 a legally resident japanese petitioned for naturalization, arguing that he met the color requirement. Associ ate justice George Sutherland, speaking fo r the Supreme Court, explained that "white" did not refer to color but to membership in the Caucasian race. A few months later in the case of a "Hindu" appealing the denial of his petition fo r cit izenship, again speaking for the Court, the same justice Sutherland was unimpressed by the fact that Indians are Caucasians; "white," he declared, refers to color, not to race. Thus within the space of one year the Court had ruled both that "white" meant the Caucasian race and not color and that it meant color and not the Caucasian race. In both cases the Asian petitioners were denied citizenship with a naturalized immigrant from England writing the majority decision. 1 3 judges even ventured to involve themselves in the question of proportion of nonwhite "blood" which might render one inel igible for citizenship. In 1934 justice Benjamin Cardozo, speak ing for a unanimous Court, offered the fo llowing dictum regard ing non-Caucasians:
Nor is the range of the exclusion limited to persons of the fu ll blood. The privilege of naturalization is denied to all who are not white (unless the applicants are of African nativity or African descent); and men are not white if the strain of colored blood in them is a half or a quarter, or, not improbably, even less, the governing test always being that of common understanding. Tw enty five years earlier, another federal judge had ruled that a "person, one-half white and one-half of some other race, belongs to neither of those races, but is literally a half-breed." 14 Following the rulings that Asians were racially ineligible to become American citizens, Congress in 1924 prohibited the immigration of "persons ineligible for citizenship." The Chinese had been denied entry previously by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and Japanese immigration had been severely limited by the Gentlemen's Agreement with Ja pa n in 1907. Furthermore those Asians already resident in the country were subjected to segregation in schools, hospitals, and housing and to exclusion from the mainstream of employment and public affairs. The removal of some 250,000 Mexican-Americans and perhaps an equal number of Mexicans to Mexico during the Depression and the internment and relocation of Japanese-Americans during the Second Wo rld War exemplified this kind of policy. Even when explicit racial classifications were all but removed from the law in the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, immigration quotas accomplished the same result by severely restricti ng the number of nonwhites allowed to enter the country.
To many Americans Southern and Eastern Europeans were nonwh ites. The great waves of immigration duri ng the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century created a patch work of ethnic minorities and complex patterns of ethnic dis crimination; however, except fo r immigration matters such dis crimination did not become embodied in official policy. Distinguishing the various kinds of "white ethnics" in a legal code wou ld have been infin itely complex and politically disas trous; moreover, it was unnecessary. Ethnic separation and dis parate treatment could thrive quite well as the unofficial practice of both public and private institutions.
The characterization of the Hispanic population has shifted from nationality to race to ethnic group. In 1821 when Mexico won its independence from Spain, Americans did not consider Mexicans to be a separate race; they were white, and unti l 1930 the u.S. Census Bureau's interest in Mexican-Americans, as in most immigrants, was in counting the foreign-born population. The classifi cation "Mexican" was used to designate only those persons born in Mexico or their children. In 1930, however, the Census Bureau placed the term, "Mexican," under the genera l rubric "other races," wh ich also included Native Americans, Negroes, and Asians. In one stroke Mexicans became another race, hence nonwhites. This was the fi rst time that a nationality was formally recognized as a race. In addition census enumer ators were instructed to classify as Mexicans all persons of Mexican ancestry regardl ess of number of generations in the United States. This designation evinced unfavorable reaction from the government of Mexico as well as the U.S. State Department, and was replaced in 1940 by a classifi cation based upon the Spanish language -whether Spanish was the mother to ngue or not. Hispanics thus became a linguistic minority. Coding instructions of the 1940 Census directed that "Mexicans were to be listed as White, unless they were definite ly Indian or some other race than White." In 1950 the Spanish surname def inition was introduced, and at the same time, such people were now classified among Whites -"white persons of Spanish sur name." Mexicans were now white ethnics. Other Latinos also became Whites consistent with the 1960 Census which provid ed that "Puerto Ricans, Mexicans or other persons of Lati n descent [were] to be classified as 'White' unless they were defi nitely Negro, Indian, or some other race." The reclassification was significant for some groups: fo r example, during the Second Wo rld War the U.S. military classified Puerto Ricans as another race, which translated to mean they were not white. Under that policy, the U.S. Army had placed Puerto Ricans in segregated fac ilities, even on the island, and the U.S. Navy refused to accept any of them into its ranks.
In the meantime states also struggled with categorizing Latinos. For example, guided by the Encyclopedia Britannica wh ich held that approximately one-fifth of Mexicans were Whites, approximately two-fifths were Indians, and the balance had African, Chinese and Japanese heritage, an Indiana appell ate court ruled, in Inland Steel Co, v. Barcena, that a Mexican was not necessarily white. In contrast, Independent School District v. Salvatierra (1 930) and in Hernandez v. State (1 952), Texan courts ruled that Mexicans are white.
By the middle of the twentieth century th is intricate patch work of rac ial and ethnic delineations and the policies they implied were long overdue fo r rethinking. Global events, including the horrific racial policies of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, nationalist movements in the colonial world, and ideological competition fo r the allegiance of the newly emergent states, as well as domestic developments led to the evolution of a new model of minority relations policy.
III
Over a period of perhaps twenty-five years (roughly from the 1940s through the 1960s) the focus of laws on race and ethnici ty changed from an intention to mandate separate and disparate treatment to the fo rbidding of separation and disparate treat ment. Segregation laws were repealed or ruled unconstitutional; federa l executive orders, administrative guideli nes, and statutes were enacted to fo rbid discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin. Private employers, schools, and other institu tions erased racial identifications from their records, often replacing them with covert codified substitutions. Race and eth nicity became taboo subjects: one was no longer Mexican, but a "person of Spanish descent," no longer a Jew, but a "person of the Hebrew persuasion." Many fe lt uncomfortable with Negro; "black" or Afro-American or African American became prefer able. In the same way, "Native American" rose as an alternative to Indian. Clearly consciousness of race and ethnicity had not diminished; on the contrary it was probably enhanced by the "civil rights" movement.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act is the most important national pol icy statement of this type. Title II fo rbids discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of race, color, national origin, or religion; Title VI does the same thing fo r employment, adding sex as a prohibited classification. Religion is briefly defined in the Act, but not one word indicates what race, color, or national origin mean. We suggest two explanations for this silence -both plausible and both probably accurate. First, the s i l ence indicates, as already suggested, a real discomfort with these classifi cations in an era in which the thrust is to get away from classifying. More significantly it is not particularly impor tant to define race and ethnicity precisely in a law which fo rbids discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. If restaurant owners are forbidden to refuse service on the basis of race, it is not important that they know who is or who is not black. Nor need law enforcement offi cials know.
A statute, of course, is only a general policy statement; fo r its details and its applications, we need to consult judicial inter pretations and the guideli nes of agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Management and the Budget (OMB). As expected, race is vir tually undefi ned. EEOC guideli nes on race indicate only that "An employee may be included in the group to which he or she appears to belong, identifies with, or is regarded by the commu nity as belonging."1S The term "national origin," however, did seem to raise some provocative defi nitional issues. Simply pro hibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin fa iled to give adequ ate direction to employers. To begin with the words do not mean exactly what they say. "National origin" does not mean the individual's own national origin; it refers to the nation al origin of his ancestors -roughly, to his ethnicity. 16 Th is ambi guity engendered considerable litigation because (despite the words of the law) it is quite permissible to exclude foreign-born non-citizens from numerous kinds of employment opportu ni ties,17 as some members of the military discovered as recently as during the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
It took a number of years to develop an understanding of "national origin" discrimination, and numerous questions remain unanswered. The EEOC does not provide a clear defi ni tion of "national origin," but an unissued version of a guideline draft suggests the fo llowing:
Discrimination based on national origin shall be defi ned broadly to mean: (1 ) Discrimination based on the country from where an individual or his fo rebears came; (2) Discrimination against an individual who possesses the cultural or linguistic characteristics com mon to an ethnic or national group.1 B The elements of "cultural and linguistic characteristics" necessi tated further distinctions. EEOC guideli nes were elaborated by rules prohibiting the fo llowing practices:
(1 ) Denial of equal opportunity to persons married to or associ ated with persons of a specific national origin; (2) Denial of equal opportunity because of membership in lawfu l organizations identifi ed with or seeking to pro-mote the interests of national groups; (3 ) Denial of equal opportunity because attendance at schools or churches commonly utilized by persons of a given national origin; (4) Denial of equal opportunity because one's name or that of one's spouse reflects a certa in national origin. 19 Furthermore English language requirements, and height and weight requirements, if not job-related, may unlawfully discrim inate against national minorities. Neither may an employer use appearance as a reason fo r refusing employment if appearance is associ ated with a particular national group. Nor may ethnic harassment (ethnic jokes and slurs, fo r example) be permitted to create a hosti le work environment fo r a minority employee.
All of these guideli nes are phrased as "Thou Shalt Not"; they attempt to tel l employers what they may not do. Behind th is form is a particular view of discrimination. It reflects a belief that discrimination is a discrete, individual, act wh ich can be pro hibited as simply as any other crime. Once these disagreeable practices were eliminated the remaining condition wou ld be one of equal opportunity. Th is notion reflects a "melting pot" view of the American dream, in which race and ethnicity were to become irreleva nt to individual achievement. Defi ning ethnici ty was unimportant --even repugnant-because ethnic disti nc tions should be unimporta nt. Th is was a compelling vision; for many, it remains so. As a guideline for public poli cy, however, it did not work.
Discrimination turned out to be not a discrete act, but a sys tem ic process. Racial and ethnic classifications could be oblit erated from the record, and their effects remain untouched. Countless other characteristics -wea lth, residency, educational attainment, English language proficiency, fo r example-could easily stand in the place of race or ethnicity, and produce the same exclusions. As early as the mid-1 960s observers began to realize that we might need racially or ethnically conscious solu tions to racial and ethnic problems. In the words of Associ ate Justice Harry Blackmun, "In order to get beyond racism, we must fi rst take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them diffe rently. We cannot -we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy." Consequently, as the policies changed, so did the ways of defi ning race and ethnicity. 2 0 IV Since discrimination is systemic, it needs systemic solutions. Above all solutions required not only individual prohibitions but policies aimed at affecting the opportunities of minorities in the aggregate. Th is development can be observed most clearly in the employment and political policies, because both affect large numbers of people, and because they have produced detailed and profuse guideli nes, regulations, and judicial decisions.
The simple kind of discrimination-the individual, intention al act which the 1964 Civil Rights Act sought to prohibit-tu rned out to be very difficult to prove. The complainant assumes the burden of proving that the employer intended to discriminate . A clever employer with any sophistication can obscure such intent by adopting apparently neutral criteria which have a racially or ethnically disproportionate impact. Hence, to combat discrimi nation in practice, it becomes important to focus not on intent, but on the impact of an employment practice. Employment cri teria (tests, educational attainment, English language, fo r exam ple) wh ich adversely and disproportionately affect ethnic minori ties are considered "inherently suspect"; their use shifts the bur den of proof from the complainant to the employer, making the employer responsible fo r defending the validity of his criteria by demonstrating their relevance to actual job performance.2 1 Not only in employment but also in voting, education, and other areas, policy developments reflect a shift in emphasis from the individual act of intentional discrimination to a focus on the aggregate effect of a practice and the design ing of aggregate solutions. The 1965 Voting Rights Act, as amended, was adopt ed explicitly because earlier attempts to remedy discrimination through individual challenges had proven unsuccessfu l. Voting discrimination against minorities, ranging from ingenious legal subterfuges to physical harassment, had long been an intrinsic element of the political process in many areas. The Act outlawed the devices that had been designed to exclude minorities from the franchise (poll taxes and literacy tests, fo r example). More important, it provided that where voter registration was below fifty percent, and where such devices had been used, the low registration wou ld be presumed to have resulted from intention al acts, and wou ld thus trigger special scrutiny of any changes in electoral procedu res by the Justice Department.22 As with fed eral employment guideli nes the triggering mechanism is dispro portionate impact on minorities, and the goal is to produce aggregate results. From aggregate remedies it is only a small step to aggregate programs such as affirmative action, wh ich mandate that some preference be given to minority candidates in order to enhance the aggregate representation of these groups in the workpl ace, school, or voting district.
This change in policy ra ises some fascinati ng issues. In order to show disproportionate impact, one must be able to col lect some comparative data about the proportions of minority members in the challenged institution and in the population as a whole. Thus it becomes important again to have defi nitions of race and ethnicity. Furthermore, the ki nds of definitions needed are diffe rent from those required previously. One no longer needs individually precise algorithms but workable heuristics for collecting aggregate data. Who can claim minority status now becomes crucial. Po litically it becomes extremely significant who counts as "white" and who counts as a minority and how the minorities are grouped together. In the end pursuing a tech nical question like definitions of race and ethnicity leads to some of the fu ndamental issues of American pluralism.
The ability to make a negative impact claim depends upon the availabil ity of ethnic data. Hence, which groups are includ ed in which categories and how the groups are defined become politically important. Race remains the most crucial. Whereas previous defi nitions of race sought some kind of objective crite rion, contemporary models rely much more heavily on self-or community-identifi cation. The Census Bureau prefers self-iden tifi cation, augmented by some simple guidelines in case of ambi guity:
The concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identifi cation by respondents; it does not denote any clear-cut scientific defi nition of biological stock. Since the 1980 census obtained info rmation on race through self-identification, the data represent self-classifi cation by people according to the race with which they identify. Fo r persons who could not provide a single response to the race question, the race of the person's mother was used; however, if a single response could not be provided for the person's mother, the fi rst race reported by the person was used. Th is is a modifi cation of the 1970 census procedu re, in which the race of a person's father was used .... The category 'Black' includes persons who indicated their race as Black or Negro, as well as persons who did not classify themselves in one of the specific race cate gories listed on the questionnaire, but reported entries such as Jamaican, Black Puerto Rican, West Indian, Haitian, or Nigerian. 23 The most detailed defi nitions available on race and eth nici ty are those used in Federal Contract Compliance, wh ich requires employers to maintain records on the race and ethnici ty of job applicants. liThe Glossary of Te rms" in the compliance manual includes the fo llowi ng defi nitions:
American Indian or Alaskan Native -A person with origins in any of the original peoples of North America who maintains cultural identification through tribal affi liation or community recognition.
Asian or Pa cific Islander -A person with origins in any of the original peoples of the Fa r East, Southeast Asia, the Indian sub-continent, or the Pa cific Islands. Th is includes, for example, China, Japan, Korea, the Philippine Republic, and Samoa.
Black, not Hispanic origin -A person with origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa who is also not of Hispanic origin.
Hispanic -A person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, South American, or Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race.
White, not of Hispanic origin -A person with origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East who are not of Hispanic origin. 24 Behind these definitions lies a subtle theory of ethnicity as a geo graphic phenomenon. Each defi nition is phrased in terms of the geographic origins of the person's ancestors. The notion that an individual has "origins" other than his or her place of birth appears vague if not mystical. Moreover it seems unsatisfying to conceive of ethnicity only in terms of the national roots of one's ancestors . Some groups-Irish-Americans, or Mexican Americans-may indeed th ink of their ethnicity as rel ated to the country of their ancestors' origin; however, such a conceptual ization gives great consternation to ethnically conscious Jews of diverse geographical "origins." Secondly, it seems to miscon ceive the essential phenomenon of black ethnicity. "Origins in Africa" are probably not at the heart of the subjective experience of black ethnicity as much as perceptions of a shared history in America and obvious distinguishing characteristics such as color.
Furthermore the obvious vagueness of these defi nitions is extremely instructive. It is quite easy for persons of mixed ances try to fa ll through the cracks in the defi nition, the creation of the Biracial category in the 2000 Census and in a number of recent ly enacted state laws notwithstanding. Fo r example how does one classify a person of mixed Asian and European parentage? The answer is that it does not really matter. Since these gui de lines are used for collecting aggregate data and the maki ng of aggregate policy, no treatment of any individual should depend on whether he or she is classified Asian or White. Occasionally, there may be infu riati ng injustices, such as intentional misclassi fications in order to take advantage of minority-sensitive pro grams. But the point of these guideli nes is really not to assure individually equal treatment (that goal is still handled under the non-d iscrimination model) but to promote general changes in minority representation.
One is reminded of Aristotle's admonition not to demand more precision than the subject requires. Race, biologists sug gest, is purely a statistical concept wh ich makes no sense as applied to individuals. Group defi nitions therefore become the only kind possible. Hence the search fo r individually applicable defi nitions wou ld be futile. Ethnicity also refers to the shared attributes of groups and thus characterizes individuals only in their group rel ations.
If one is going to challenge and to change practices based on their impact on minorities, comparative data must be avail-able. But data is collected about some groups and not others, and the way that the human population is classified is as politi cally significant as it is arbitrary. Certainly no anthropologist could justify treati ng Hispanic as parallel with Black, White, and Asian. The point is that Hispanics are listed separately because they have a unique position in the American experience, and thus are regarded as minorities. We can understand the impor tance of this inclusion by observing its political significance in a concrete instance. In 1973 the city of Denver was accused of segregating its public schools. Whether the charge could be sub stantiated depended upon whether Hispanic students were counted as white or nonwhite for the purpose of school assign ment. If Hispanic students were counted as white, the school district did not appear to be segregated, but if they were consid ered minorities (along with blacks), the system appeared quite segregated. The Supreme Court's handling of this issue gives an idea of its policy significance.
[Al word must be said about the District Court's method of defining a 'segregated' school. Denver is a tri-eth nic, as distingui shed from a biracial community. The over all rac ial and ethnic composition of the Denver public schools is 66% Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% Hispano. The District court in assessing the question of de jure segregation in the core city schools, preliminarily resolved that Negroes and Hispanos should not be placed in the same category to establish the segregated character of the school . . .. Later, in determining the schools that were likely to produce an infe rior educa tional opportunity, the court concluded that a school wou ld be considered infe rior only if it had a "concen tration of either Negro or Hispano students in the gen eral area of 70 to 75% .... We conclude ... that the District court erred in sep arating Negroes and Hispanos for purposes of defi ning a 'segregated school. ' We have held that Hispanos con stitute an identifiable class fo r purposes of the Fou rteenth Amendment. But there is also much evi dence that in the Southwest Hispanos and Negroes have a great many thi ngs in common .... [Tl hough of diffe rent origins, Negroes and Hispanos in Denver suf fe r identical discrimination in treatment when com pared with treatment afforded Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think petitioners are entitled to have schools with a combined predominance of Negroes and Hispanos included in the category of 'segregated' schools.25 Not only who is a minority but also who is not a minority is significant. Since "minorities," fo r all practical purposes, are lim ited to blacks, Asians, and Hispanics, it is virtually impossible fo r so-called "white ethnics" to make adverse impact claims. Because separate figures are not kept fo r Po les, Italians, Jews, Arabs, etc., they lack the comparative data to show that they have been disproportionally excluded from employment or other opportunities. Joseph Alegretti, an eth icist and labor law spe cialist, writes:
[OJ isparate impact requires statistical proof of the effect of the effect of an employment practice on the plaintiff's group in comparison to other groups. Compiling the needed statistics is not a problem for black or female or Spanish-surnamed plaintiffs . However, the absence of necessary statistical information presents a nearly insur mountable barrier to a person of Polish, Irish, or Russian ancestry who wishes to bring a disparate impact case. The reason fo r the dearth of info rmation is simple: no governmental agency requires employers to compile data on the national origin of employees. The EEOC's reporti ng fo rms such as the EEO-1 limit their categorization to five groups: black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian, and white. Persons of European or North American origin are classified as white. The Uniform Guideli nes on Employee Selection Procedure of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) affi rmative action guideli nes ... adopt the same classified scheme. Likewise, the 1970 census included questions on race and Spanish origin, but the only questio !1 con cerning other ethnic groups was one that asked the country of origin of one's parents. Th us the Census Bureau does not compile the ethnic identity statistical information that is necessary to bring a disparate impact claim. 26 One of the more intriguing instances of this morass was raised by an attempt under the 1965 Voting Rights Act to redraw the electoral district boundaries in New Yo rk City in order to enhance the voti ng strength of blacks and Puerto Ricans. To do so a predominantly Hasidic electoral district was split and its vot ing strength seriously eroded. The Supreme Court upheld th is procedure as a legitimate effort to correct the disabilities suffe red by minorities. Hasidim may be a minority, but for purposes of the Voting Rights Act they were simply "white."27 Considerable controversy also arose over the inclusion of Asian-Americans among disadvantaged applicants in the University of California special admissions program challenged in the Bakke case. In spite of ethnic discrimination Asian Americans achieved high rates of admission to professional schools even under regular admissions procedu res; hence, some argued that their inclusion in the special admissions program unfairly disadvantaged other minorities.
Clearly there is no simple answer to deciding which minori ties are minorities in American society. The difficulty of selecting some minorities in a pluralistic setting was quite well stated in the Bakke opinion by Justice Powell:
[Ilt was no longer possible to peg the guarantees of the Fo urteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one racial minority. During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had become a nation of minoriti es. Each had to struggle-and to some extent sti l l-to overcome the prej udices not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of whom it was said-perhaps unfairly in many cases-that a shared characteristic was willingness to disadvantage other groups. As a nation fi lled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination .... The concepts of 'majority' and 'minority' necessari ly reflect temporary arra ngements and political judg-ments . . .. [T] he white 'majority' is itself composed of va rious minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the state and private individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judi cial tolerance of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, fo r then the only 'majority' left wou ld be the new minority of White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled basis of deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial solicitude,' and which wou ld not.28 The Bakke decision is profoundly ambivalent. On the one hand the Court plurality rejects the contention that any group of minorities can lay claim to permanent minority status and spe cial solicitude at the expense of individual fa irness. On the other hand the plurality recognizes that racially and ethnically sensi tive programs are necessary to achi eve the social diversity that a pluralist society purports to value. Both of these positions were re-enforced by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor with her decision in Grutter v. Bol/inger.29 These cases reflect much more than the Court's ambivalence, rather the dilemma of an entire society caught between two competing models of minority relations.
Current legal defi nitions of race and ethnicity thus reflect a profound ambivalence toward ethnic and racial classifications. Americans are caught between the model of individual justice implied by the non-d iscrimination model and the competing desire for a racially and ethnically just soci ety. They deeply value the color-blind nondiscrimination model with its rejection of ethnic classifications as irrelevant and repugnant. And yet, valuing results, they recognize that a pluralistic soci ety can only be achieved by effecting changes in the way minorities are rep resented in various sectors of American life. Classifying is, at best, a necessary evil. The need fo r aggregate solutions implies a need to classify; hence definitions are constructed. The defini tions, however, are almost absurdly vague. Defi nitions phrased in terms of "origins in" an area reflect a discomfort with any but the most open-ended classifi cations. Even more indicative of this uneasiness is the insistence on self-identifications rather than the "objective" criteria of the early model (percentages of
